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7hese short introductions delve into the 
anarchist canon to recover some of  the 
distinctive ideas that historical anarchists 
advanced to address problems relevant to their 
circumstances. Although these contexts were 
special, many of  the issues the anarchists wrestled 
with still plague our lives. Anarchists developed 
a body of  writing about power, domination, 
injustice and exploitation, education, prisons 
and a lot more besides. Honing in on different 
facets of  the anarchist canon is not just an 
interesting archaeological exercise. The persistence, 
development and adaptation of  anarchist traditions 
depends on our surveying the historical landscape 
of  ideas and drawing on the resources it contains. 
The theoretical toolbox that this small assortment 
of  anarchists helped to construct is there to use, 
amend and adapt.
Agitate, Educate, Organise! 
GREAT ANARCHISTS
T
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9orn Johann Kaspar Schmidt in Beyreuth 
in 1806, Stirner is one of  the most 
controversial anarchists, by turns 
celebrated as the seminal anarchist theorist and 
marginalised as a political philosopher only 
tangentially related to the anarchist movement. 
The nineteenth-century commentator E.V. 
Zenker billed Stirner as the German Proudhon, 
one of  the movement’s two intellectual 
forerunners; Paul Eltzbacher listed him as one 
of  the seven exponents of  anarchist philosophy. 
His reputation has fared less well over time and 
recently anarchist-communists have rejected him 
from anarchism’s history. 
Stirner’s rise from obscurity helps explain the 
controversy he stirs. His book The Ego and Its 
Own, published in 1844, was well reviewed, 
attracted considerable criticism and was banned 
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by government censors in 1845 – yet for thirty-
odd years it remained largely ignored. Stirner had 
laid the groundwork for his later notoriety as a 
member of  the Young Hegelians, the philosophical 
circle that met in Berlin in the 1840s, where he 
became acquainted with Marx and Engels. Engels 
had regarded Stirner as a friend and Marx was 
sufficiently impressed in 1842 to publish two 
of  Stirner’s essays: The False Principle of  Our 
Education and Art and Religion. Yet, working as 
a pair, Marx and Engels trashed Stirner’s work. 
Perhaps also regarding him as a rival, they painted 
him as a hopelessly abstract, confused, bourgeois 
individualist, spitefully nicknaming him Saint Max. 
What remains of  their substantial critique of  
The Ego and Its Own takes up the best part of  
the German Ideology, a manuscript produced in 
1845 but not published until 1932. A vulgarised 
version of  their critique was popularised in the 
1890s just at the point that Stirner’s ideas were 
being revived by the anti-communist anarchists 
Benjamin Tucker and, most importantly, John 
Henry Mackay. In 1895, the Marxist founder of  
the Russian Social Democratic Movement Georgi 
11
Plekhanov rehashed Marx and Engles’ appraisal, 
this time stressing Stirner’s affinity – as translator 
of  Adam Smith and J. B. Say – with classical liberal 
political economy. Indeed, forging a link between 
egoism and laissez faire liberalism, Plekhanov 
praised Stirner as the “most consequent of  
anarchists” in order to damn all anarchists as 
irrevocably individualist. To make matters worse, 
Stirner was embraced at around the same time 
by ultra-conservatives who gravitated towards 
Cosima Wagner, the composer’s anti-Semitic 
second wife and purveyor of  German cultural 
and racial superiority. The idea that Stirner had 
anticipated Nietzsche’s Ubermensch was quickly 
established (though there is scant evidence to 
suggest that Nietzsche had read Stirner). The effect 
was twofold: as well as adding an aristocratic lustre 
to the interpretation of  the egoist and superman, 
it enabled writers in the post-war period to paint 
anarchism as a totalitarian, illiberal ideology. Anti-
anarchist historians fascinated by the esteem that 
Proudhon enjoyed with proto-fascists in early 
twentieth-century France could now play with 
another intellectual lineage to build a bridge from 
anarchism to fascism. 
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Learning to love Stirner is not an uncomplicated 
task. With constant repetition, the assertion 
that egoism underpins anarchism has stuck, at 
least partially. Stirner’s derision of  Proudhon’s 
declaration “property is theft” as priestly moralising 
hardly helps would-be friends rebut claims of  his 
petite bourgeois inclinations. It’s not surprising, 
then, that swathes of  anarchist communists 
have preferred to accept the Marxist critique and 
remove Stirner from anarchism’s history than 
mount a counter-attack or defence. Stirner’s most 
vocal anarchist advocates have barely eased his 
rehabilitation. In the work of  his followers, Stirner 
variously emerges as a neo-Hobbesian, hyper-
liberal or joyful hedonist. In the first he appears 
as a proponent of  the view that humans are, or 
should be, self-directed because life is necessarily 
a struggle between individuals for domination. In 
the second, he is an advocate of  autonomy and 
endless pluralism. In the third, he champions the 
prohibition of  prohibitions. 
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EGOISM:      
THE ANARCHISTS’ DILEMMA 
Stirner’s greatness comes from the dilemma he 
creates for anarchists broadly attracted by his 
commitment to ‘ownness’ – his refusal to suspend 
individual judgment and his positive endorsement 
that individuals discover themselves and recover 
their uniqueness. In The Ego and Its Own, 
ownness involves a rejection of  political and 
moral obligations: individuals should do nothing 
other than follow their will. Thus Stirner exhorts 
individuals to become egoists – this is the only 
good he recognises. Each must understand that 
the promise of  freedom through the realisation 
of  rights in the liberal state is illusory; each must 
take possession of  itself  to avoid being trapped by 
instinctual desires and/or automatic compliance 
with social norms. In one of  his more provocative 
moments, Stirner argued that the radical “moral 
man” who never doubted “that the copulation 
of  brother and sister is incest, that monogamy is 
the truth of  marriage, that filial piety is a sacred 
duty” and shuddered at the idea of  “being allowed 
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to touch his sister as wife”, remained ensnared 
by inherited rules that were not of  his own 
making. Stirner professed complete indifference 
to the moral standards enshrined in law or social 
practice. Accordingly he styled the egoist as one 
able to stand aloof  from convention. “Entitled 
or unentitled – that does not concern me, if  I 
am only powerful, I am of  myself  empowered, and 
need no other empowering or entitling.” While 
Kropotkin included Stirner in the anarchist 
family, he parted company with him on this point. 
Kropotkin believed that people should reflect on 
their moral codes. He endorsed the nihilist demand 
to scrutinise all values and the nihilists’ refusal to 
observe conventions. But he did not accept that it 
was possible for individuals to detach themselves 
from their social contexts as Stirner suggested and 
he believed that anarchists who attempted to do so 
were misguided. 
The upside of  Stirner’s defence of  egoism is his 
exhilarating critique of  the state and the idea of  
the common good. The downside is that to live 
as egoists, individuals must reject all obligations 
and commitments beyond the dedication to 
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egoism. The dilemma Stirner poses is about how 
far the anarchist rejection of  political and moral 
obligations can and should be pushed.  
HIERARCHY AND DOMINATION
Unlike the writers who dominated the Young 
Hegelians, Stirner was critical of  the radical 
political project to reform the state along humanist 
lines. He identified this with the construction of  
the state and the idea of  the nation and he argued 
that it would result in the replication of  hierarchy 
and domination. 
Stirner’s critique extended from his scepticism 
about the emancipatory potential of  political 
philosophy. The hope of  philosophy was that 
the ‘cultured’ would be able to devise perfect 
social orders. Before the eighteenth century, it 
was self-consciously designed as an exercise in the 
mastery of  the mind over matter by the cultured 
on behalf  of  the ‘uncultured’, this latter group 
being the “animal mass” that was incapable of  
thinking independently, and which fell into line 
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with the perfect orders the cultured invented. With 
Hegel, all this appeared to be changed. Philosophy 
obtained a new objectivity, uniting ideas with reality 
and overcoming the gap between ideal theory 
and material reality. For Stirner the change was 
deceptive. What happened was that philosophers 
got caught up in their own cleverness, and this 
rendered them insensible to the domination that 
mind now attained as the driver of  social change. 
It appeared to the cultured that their favourite 
concepts were in fact real. Consequently, while 
the prospect of  attaining perfection remained 
as compelling as ever, the mastery of  mind was 
now concealed. “Hierarchy is the domination of  
thoughts, dominion of  mind!” Stirner suggested 
that it reached unparalleled heights in the 
nineteenth century.
Humanism was the stuff  of  the philosophers’ 
dreams. The same visions of  the egalitarian 
community and brotherly love motivated political 
actors, too. Robespierre and St. Just, the leaders 
of  the French revolution, dedicated themselves 
to the destruction of  monarchical absolutism and 
the tyranny of  the Catholic Church. Yet unable 
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to escape the domination of  mind, they created 
a new holy order to replace it. This centred on 
the idea of  man. Man was not a person but a 
“spook” or a concept of  a person who exhibited 
particular virtues, adopted a fixed set of  values, 
and unselfishly struggled for the attainment 
of  the social conditions that would enable real 
human beings to thrive – thus bringing reality in 
line with the ideal. What was the result? Stirner’s 
pithy answer was: The Terror. “Because the 
revolutionary priests... served Man, they cut off  
the heads of  men.”
Stirner called the institutional form that 
corresponded to this humanist ideal liberalism. It 
could take liberal, social and humane forms. In the 
first rights were equalised; the second abolished 
property ownership; and the third unified faith. 
In equating liberalism with ‘the State’, Stirner 
emphasised its stultifying uniformity. Whereas 
the state had once described a discrete group 
within the broader social unit, it now encapsulated 
the whole. Statists rejected factions, separate 
interests and difference. In the name of  equality, 
they promoted the general over the particular 
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and the common good over the well-being of  
the minority or the individual. Citizens accepted 
the state’s levelling, even though it was utterly 
demeaning. Stirner used ‘equality of  rights’ as 
an example. This doctrine was passed off  as a 
principle of  fairness, but it actually indicated 
that “the State has no regard for my person, that 
to it I, like every other, am only a man, without 
having another significance that commands its 
deference”. Whichever of  the “innumerable 
multitude of  rights” states conferred – the “right 
to lead a battalion”, the “right to lecture at a 
university” – each award confirmed the State’s 
total disregard for the special qualities that right-
holders possessed, and reinforced compliance 
with the conditions attached to the occupation 
of  roles. 
Citizens were duty-bound to advance the State’s 
interests as their own even at their physical and 
psychological cost. State law was in any case 
implemented by physical force, but because 
state violence was normalised and neutralised 
as righteous punishment, transgression was 
necessarily internalised by citizens as criminality. 
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The arch chicanery of  the state was to advertise 
its guardianship of  the very freedom it negated. 
Self-styled as the protector of  liberties, the state 
became indispensable to humanity’s flourishing. 
The inevitable upshot was that the state was 
compelled to prioritise its own interests over the 
citizenry. Political liberty was said to mean “my 
liberty” but translated into “the liberty of  a power 
that rules and subjugates me”. “State, religion, 
conscience” thus “make me a slave, and their 
liberty is my slavery.” The state sanctified itself, 
following the principle of  “the end hallows the 
means”, and in this it was essentially Jesuitical, 
“moral”. Stirner explained: “If  the welfare of  the 
State is the end, war is a hallowed means; if  justice 
is the State’s end, homicide is a hallowed means, 
and is called by its sacred name ‘execution’; the 
sacred State hallows everything that is serviceable 
to it”. Two maxims summed up his anarchist view: 
“Liberty of  the people is not my liberty”; “Every 
State is a despotism”. 
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PROMISING 
Once asked how he reconciled his advocacy of  
Marxism-Leninism with the individualism of  the 
Black Panthers, Eldridge Cleaver replied that all 
ideological systems were repressive and that “any 
constraint on our freedoms is not acceptable”. 
The sentiment resonates with Stirner’s egoism but 
it begs a question about the tools Stirner provided 
to support resistance or liberation. 
Stirner’s politics was anti-revolutionary, and 
insurrectionary. Explaining the difference he 
defined revolution as the effort to bring new 
arrangements into being and insurrection as the 
struggle against arrangements. Insurrection “leads 
us no longer to let ourselves be arranged, but to 
arrange ourselves”. Christ was an insurrectionist. 
Preaching obedience and refusing to lead the Jews 
in revolt against their Roman masters, he created 
mayhem simply by attending to himself  rather than 
to others and treading his own path “untroubled 
about and undisturbed” by the authorities. Christ 
was an “insurgent”, the “deadly enemy” and “real 
21
annihilator”. Refusing to acknowledge the state’s 
claims, he constructed his own rules independently 
of  it and so revealed its emptiness.
Stirner suggested that egoism was compatible 
with combined action and talked of  “all slaves” 
attaining their freedom. He also imagined the 
“union of  egos”. This coalition would take shape 
from the “incessant self-uniting” activity of  egos, 
encouraging fluid, impermanent relationships 
within the body of  dead society; however, 
while the egoist could take part in gatherings, 
social bonds were disallowed – egoism meant 
disregarding the interests of  others. Here Stirner’s 
ideal diverged markedly from any traditional view 
of  Christ’s mission: “What you have the power to 
be you have the right to. I derive all right and all 
warrant from me; I am entitled to everything that 
I have in my power”. 
There was no love, for this entailed sacrifice 
and demanded ‘self-sacrifice’ in turn. Nor was 
community possible. This was a fiction or spook 
and Stirner insisted that it required egos to enter 
into relationships that were enslaving. Egoists 
should forego it, appropriate the state’s powers 
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and exercise them exclusively for their own 
satisfaction. Others were “only means and organs 
which we may use as our property!”. The fatally 
injured woman who strangled her child in order 
to die ‘satisfied’ was an exemplar. She did not 
let love – either for her child or the community 
it may have enriched – get the better of  her will. 
Promising was likewise impossible. Were “I to 
be bound to-day and henceforth to my will of  
yesterday” my “will would... be frozen”. Promising 
made the ego “a bondman”, a “willer yesterday” 
and “to-day without a will: yesterday voluntary, 
to-day involuntary”. The road to freedom lay in 
“recognizing no duty, not binding myself  nor letting 
myself  be bound”.
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